Forgetting as a knowledge management operation has received much less attention than operations like inference, or revision. It was mainly in the area of logic programming that techniques and axiomatic properties have been studied systematically. However, at least from a cognitive view, forgetting plays an important role in restructuring and reorganizing a human's mind, and it is closely related to notions like relevance and independence which are crucial to knowledge representation and reasoning. In this paper, we propose axiomatic properties of (intentional) forgetting for general epistemic frameworks which are inspired by those for logic programming, and we evaluate various forgetting operations which have been proposed recently by Beierle et al. according to them. The general aim of this paper is to advance formal studies of (intentional) forgetting operators while capturing the many facets of forgetting in a unifying framework in which different forgetting operators can be contrasted and distinguished by means of formal properties.

Forgetting as a knowledge management operation has received much less attention than operations like inference, or revision. It was mainly in the area of logic programming that techniques and axiomatic properties have been studied systematically. However, at least from a cognitive view, forgetting plays an important role in restructuring and reorganizing a human's mind, and it is closely related to notions like relevance and independence which are crucial to knowledge representation and reasoning. In this paper, we propose axiomatic properties of (intentional) forgetting for general epistemic frameworks which are inspired by those for logic programming, and we evaluate various forgetting operations which have been proposed recently by Beierle et al. according to them. The general aim of this paper is to advance formal studies of (intentional) forgetting operators while capturing the many facets of forgetting in a unifying framework in which different forgetting operators can be contrasted and distinguished by means of formal properties.

We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain Euclidean distributions and analyze them experimentally.

Hunger is a major problem even in developed countries like Australia. We are working with a social startup, Foodbank Local, and local charities at distributing donated food more efficiently. This food must first be allocated to these charities and then delivered to the end customers. In this abstract, we give a formulation of this real-world online fair division problem that the food banks face every day. The products arrive during the day and are indivisible. As a very first step, we focus in here on designing simple mechanisms allocating the food more efficiently. In future, we also plan on investigating more closely the frontier between the allocation and the transportation frameworks within this mixed setting. For instance, shall we dispatch the items as soon as they arrive or shall we apply a given waiting strategy?

Schulze's rule and ranked pairs are two Condorcet methods that both satisfy many natural axiomatic properties. Schulze's rule is used in the elections of many organizations, including the Wikimedia Foundation, the Pirate Party of Sweden and Germany, the Debian project, and the Gento Project. Both rules are immune to control by cloning alternatives, but little is otherwise known about their strategic robustness, including resistance to manipulation by one or more voters, control by adding or deleting alternatives, adding or deleting votes, and bribery. Considering computational barriers, we show that these types of strategic behavior are NP-hard for ranked pairs (both constructive, in making an alternative a winner, and destructive, in precluding an alternative from being a winner). Schulze's rule, in comparison, remains vulnerable at least to constructive manipulation by a single voter and destructive manipulation by a coalition. As the first such polynomial-time rule known to resist all such manipulations, and considering also the broad axiomatic support, ranked pairs seems worthwhile to consider for practical applications.